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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF TENNESSEE V. GARNER
TO CIVIL LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
In Tennessee v. Garner,1 the Supreme Court held that the fleeing felon
rule, a common law doctrine that permitted a police officer to use deadly
force to effect the arrest of any escaping felon, was unconstitutional
under the fourth amendment.' The Court concluded that deadly force
could only be used to apprehend a fleeing felon if the officer reasonably
believed the suspect posed a significant threat of death or serious physical
injury to the officer or to others.3 The question has since arisen whether
this fourth amendment limitation should be applied retroactively to pro-
vide a basis for civil liability.4 Part I of this Note traces the erosion of the
fleeing felon rule, culminating with the Court's decision in Garner. Part
II identifies the issues to be examined under retroactivity analysis. Part
III applies the traditional retroactivity analysis used in civil cases to civil
litigation arising out of the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing
felon. This Note concludes that the Court's holding in Garner should be
applied retroactively to provide a basis for civil liability against a munici-
pal defendant.5
1. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
2. The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
3. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).
4. Compare Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 608-10 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying Garner
retroactively) and Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548-50 (11th Cir. 1985) (same) with
Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719-20 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (denying
retroactive application of Garner to civil litigation) and Carter v. City of Chattanooga,
850 F.2d 1119, 1137 (6th Cir. 1988) (declining to apply Garner to incidents occurring
prior to the Sixth Circuit's decision in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240
(6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the first decision to find the fleeing felon rule
violated the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985), was decided on March 27, 1985.
The Eighth Circuit also has applied Garner to a fleeing felon action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982) without discussing the retroactivity issue. See Griffin v. Hilke, 804 F.2d
1052, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 914 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit,
after its decision in Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1985), has applied Garner
retroactively to other police shootings. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d
1436, 1441 n.3 (11th Cir. 1985); Pruitt v. City of Montgomery, 771 F.2d 1475, 1483 n.13
(11th Cir. 1985).
5. Civil liability is based on section 1983, which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
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I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE FLEEING FELON RULE
A. Erosion of the Fleeing Felon Rule
The fleeing felon rule permitted a law enforcement officer to use deadly
force as a last resort to effect the arrest of any suspected felon, regardless
of the severity of his alleged crime.6 The justification for the use of
deadly force against any felon arose in the eighteenth century, when all
felonies were punishable by death.7 Throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, however, the common law rationales supporting the
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Typically, a section 1983 action is brought against the local municipality for its policy
of permitting the use of deadly force to effect the arrest of any felon. See Mitchell v. City
of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719-20 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Carter v. City of Chatta-
nooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1137 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989); Acoff v.
Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548-50 (11th Cir. 1985). In Monell v. Department of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that a municipality may be held
liable for damages under section 1983 for a "policy or custom" which deprived an indi-
vidual of a constitutional right. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
Although the police officers involved in an incident are usually included in the lawsuit,
individual defendants are generally found to have a qualified immunity based on their
good faith reliance on fleeing felon statutes and municipal policy. See, e.g., Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 600 F.2d 52, 54 (6th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter Garner I]. Individual
government officials are generally protected from civil liability insofar as their conduct
does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reason-
able person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
However, municipalities generally have no immunity from civil liability flowing from
their constitutional violations. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657
(1980).
6. See, e.g., Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 133-37 (2d Cir. 1975); Stinnett v. Vir-
ginia, 55 F.2d 644, 645-46 (4th Cir. 1932); Love v. Bass, 145 Tenn. 522, 529, 238 S.W. 94,
96 (1922); Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 560, 11 S.W. 651, 653 (1889). The
roots of this rule are more than 200 years old: "[i]f persons that are pursued by the
officers for felony or for just suspicion thereof ... shall not yield themselves to these
officers, but instead shall either resist or fly before they are apprehended ... are upon
necessity slain therein, it is no felony." Casenote, Tennessee v. Garner: Fourth Amend-
ment Limitations on a Peace Officer's Use of Deadly Force to Effect an Arrest, 17 Loy. U.
Chi. L.J. 151, 156 n.24 (1985) (quoting 2 M. Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae 85
(1788)). Deadly force was not permitted to prevent the escape of a fleeing misdemeanant.
See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 31 F. 710, 712-15 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1887) (dictum);
Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502, 509, 18 S.W. 854, 856 (1892); Head v. Martin, 85 Ky.
480, 483, 3 S.W. 622, 623 (1887); Holloway v. Moser, 193 N.C. 185, 187, 136 S.E. 375,
376 (1927); Casenote, supra, at 156.
7. See Sherman, Execution Without Trial Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33
Vand. L. Rev. 71, 74 (1980); see also Comment, Deadly Force to Arrest: Triggering Con-
stitutional Review, 11 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 361, 365 (1976) (common law felonies
were murder, rape, manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, mayhem, burglary, arson, prison
break and larceny, all of which were punishable by death). The use of deadly force to
prevent a felon's escape was seen as merely accelerating the penal process. Because the
felon had forfeited his life by committing the crime, it was assumed he would be more
likely to flee and therefore greater force would be needed for his apprehension. Another
rationale underlying the fleeing felon rule was that, because of the lack of sophisticated
law enforcement techniques, if the suspect was not captured at the scene he would proba-
bly never be apprehended. See Sherman, supra, at 76.
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fleeing felon rule eroded entirely.' Courts and commentators widely crit-
icized the rule because the decision to use deadly force hinged solely on
whether a crime was classified as a felony or misdemeanor. 9
Practically speaking, the rule lost much of its force because an over-
whelming majority of police departments adopted policies on the use of
deadly force that were more restrictive than the common law rule.1"
8. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 74-77. While the number of crimes classified as
felonies increased, the number of crimes punishable by death decreased dramatically. See
Comment, supra note 7, at 366-67. Violence no longer distinguished felonies from misde-
meanors. In fact, some misdemeanors presented a more serious threat to public safety
than felonies. See Greenstone, Liability of Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16
Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 397, 402-03 (1967) (addressing some of the varying degrees of danger
associated with certain misdemeanors and felonies). In the latter half of the nineteenth
century, most states retained capital punishment only for treason and crimes endangering
life. See Comment, supra note 7, at 366. Improvements in law enforcement techniques
meant it was no longer necessary to apprehend the suspect at the scene to ensure his
capture. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 76. Finally, the invention of the revolver meant
that law enforcement officers could inflict deadly force more easily and from distances
never envisioned at the inception of the original rule. See id. at 75 (when the fleeing felon
rule originated, deadly force could be inflicted only if the suspect resisted in a hand-to-
hand struggle).
9. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[A] 'shoot' [to kill] order might conceiv-
ably be tolerable to prevent the escape of a convicted killer but surely not for a car thief, a
pickpocket or a shoplifter."); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1975)
(preferable rule would be one limiting the use of deadly force only to prevent the escape
of violent felons); United States v. Clark, 31 F. 710, 713 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1887) (deadly
force to effect the arrest of petit larceny suspect "is altogether too disproportioned to the
magnitude of the offense"); Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 341 (1882) ("shocking to the
good order of government" to permit the use of deadly force on minor felony suspects);
State v. Bryant, 65 N.C. 327, 328 (1871) (noting the varying degrees of importance to
society in arresting capital felons as opposed to inferior felons); Reneau v. State, 70 Tenn.
720, 721-22 (1879) (inquiring whether the rule should be modified in view of the large
number of crimes now classified as felonies); Greenstone, supra note 8, at 402-03; Pear-
son, The Right to Kill in Making Arrests, 28 Mich. L. Rev. 957, 974 (1930); Sherman,
supra note 7, at 76-77; Comment, supra note 7, at 361; Note, Legalized Murder of a
Fleeing Felon, 15 Va. L. Rev. 582, 583-84 (1929).
The American Law Institute ("A.L.I.") first expressed what it considered to be the
preferable view of the law in its Restatement of the Law of Torts. This view limited the
use of deadly force to effect an arrest to felonies that normally involve death or serious
bodily harm, the breaking and entry of a dwelling place or treason. See Restatement of
Torts § 131 (1934). When no case followed the first Restatement, the 1948 Supplement
and the Second Restatement returned to the common law fleeing felon rule. See Restate-
ment of Torts § 131 (1948); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 131 (1965) (permitting the
use of deadly force to effect the arrest of any felon). The A.L.I.'s Model Penal Code
sought to limit a police officer's authority to use deadly force to situations where appre-
hension is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily harm to others. See Model Penal
Code § 3.07(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
10. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("Overall, only 7.5% of depart-
mental and municipal policies explicitly permit the use of deadly force against any felon;
86.8% explicitly do not." (citing K. Matulia, A Balance of Forces: A Report of the Inter-
national Association of Chiefs of Police 161 (1982))); Comment, supra note 7, at 370 &
nn.41-42 (citing the following surveys conducted on two major city police departments:
Uelmen, Varieties of Public Policy: A Study of Police Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly
Force in Los Angeles County, 6 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1 (1973) and Note, The Use of Deadly
Force in Arizona by Police Officers, 1973 L. & Soc. Ord. 481, 484-88).
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State legislatures were slower to modify the codified versions of the com-
mon law fleeing felon rule,"1 but a large number eventually did restrict
the use of deadly force.12 Despite these factors, courts hesitated to strike
down the fleeing felon rule on constitutional grounds.3 The majority of
11. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 18 (noting the "long-term movement" away from the
fleeing felon rule).
12. See generally Note, Justifiable Use of Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutory
Survey, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 67 (1970). At the time of the Supreme Court's decision
in Tennessee v. Garner, some nineteen states had retained statutory versions of the com-
mon law fleeing felon rule. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 16 n.14 (citing Ala. Code § 13A-3-27
(1982); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-510 (1977); Cal. Penal Code § 196 (West 1970); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 53a-22 (1972); Fla. Stat. § 776.05 (1983); Idaho Code § 19-610 (1979); Ind. Code
§ 35-41-3-3 (1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3215 (1981); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-15(d)
(Supp. 1984); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 563.046 (1979); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.140 (1983); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 30-2-6 (1984); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 732 (1981); Or. Rev. Stat. § 161.239
(1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-9 (1981); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 22-16-32 to 33
(1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.16.040(3) (1977);
Wis. Stat. § 939.45(4) (1981-1982)). The Court considered Oregon's and Wisconsin's
statutes less clear, but probably the common law rule. The Court in Garner also noted
that California and Indiana courts had significantly limited their fleeing felon statutes.
See Garner, 471 U.S. at 16 n.15.
Twenty states had statutorily limited the use of deadly force by police officers prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Garner. See id. at 16-17 nn.15, 17-20. Two states had
adopted section 3.07 of the Model Penal Code verbatim. See id. at 16-17 n. 17 (referring
to Haw. Rev. Stat. § 703-307 (1976); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1412 (1979)). Eighteen states
had adopted provisions permitting the use of deadly force if the suspect had committed a
felony that involved physical or deadly force or had threatened the use of such force, or if
the suspect was escaping with a deadly weapon or, if the suspect escaped he was likely to
imminently use serious physical or deadly force. See id. at 17 & n. 18 (referring to Alaska
Stat. § 11.81.370(a) (1983); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-410 (1978); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-
1-707 (1978); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 467 (1979); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-21(a) (1984);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch.38, 7-5 (1984); Iowa Code § 804.8 (1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 503.090 (1984); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 107 (1983); Minn. Stat. § 609.066
(1984); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 627:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C-3-7 (West
1982); N.Y. Penal Law § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401
(1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-05-07.2.d (1976); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 508 (1982); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 9.51(c) (1974); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-404 (1978)).
The remaining eleven states had no statutes at the time of the Garner decision. See id.
at 16-17. Louisiana and Vermont had statutes that permitted the use of deadly force to
ptevent only violent felonies. See id. at 17 n. 19 (referring to La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 14:20(2) (West 1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2305 (1974 & Supp. 1984)). Michigan,
Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia applied the common-law fleeing felon rule by case law.
See id. at 16 n.16 (referring to Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d
825 (1982); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 59-66, 396 N.E.2d 246, 255-58 (C.P. 1979);
Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125 S.E.2d 851 (1962); Thompson v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
116 W. Va. 705, 711-712, 182 S.E. 880, 883-84 (1935)). Massachusetts had conflicting
decisions, but the Supreme Court in Garner concluded that Massachusetts had probably
adopted the Model Penal Code position on deadly force. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 16-17
n.17 (referring to Uraneck v. Lima, 359 Mass. 749, 750, 269 N.E.2d 670, 671 (1971)
(adopted common-law fleeing felon rule); Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363
N.E.2d 1313 (1977) (followed Model Penal Code's deadly force rule for private citizens);
Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980) (apparently extended the
Model Penal Code rule to police officers)). Maryland, Montana, South Carolina and
Wyoming had no relevant statutes or case law and their positions were unclear at the
time of the Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee v. Garner. See id. at 17 n.20.
13. See Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247, 1251 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
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litigation concerning the fleeing felon rule dealt with the reasonableness
of the police officers' conduct, not the constitutionality of the practice
itself.'4
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Tennessee v. Garner
In 1985, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute
that codified the common law fleeing felon rule. 5 The Court held that
the statute violated the fourth amendment requirement that all seizures
be reasonable under the circumstances.16 The Court concluded that
deadly force is permissible to effect the arrest of a fleeing suspect only if
three conditions are met. First, the police officer must reasonably believe
that the felon poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer
or to others. 17 Probable cause for this belief would exist if the suspect
threatened an officer with a weapon or if the officer believed the suspect
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of seri-
ous physical harm.' 8 Second, deadly force must be necessary to prevent
the escape of the suspect.' 9 Finally, the officer must, if feasible, provide a
warning to the suspect.2"
Garner thus eliminated much of the confusion concerning the use of
deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing criminal suspect.21 The deci-
434 U.S. 822 (1977); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 1975); Beech v. Me-
lancon, 465 F.2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1972) (citing Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F. Supp.
1072, (W.D. Tenn. 1971)), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). But see Mattis v. Schnarr,
547 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated as moot sub nom., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431
U.S. 171 (1977).
14. See Comment, supra note 7, at 367-68 n.28 (analysis of the reasonableness of the
police conduct "has dampened the initiative for changing the common law rules"); Com-
ment, The Unconstitutional Use of Deadly Force Against Nonviolent Fleeing Felons: Gar-
ner v. Memphis Police Department, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 137, 145 n.31 (1983) [hereinafter
Comment, Use of Deadly Force] (most litigation challenged reasonableness of police of-
ficer's conduct, not constitutionality of state statute).
For the use of deadly force to be justified, a police officer must have reasonably believed
(1) the suspect was a felon, and (2) deadly force was necessary to apprehend the suspect.
See Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D. Wis. 1973), aff'd, 513 F.2d 79 (7th
Cir. 1975); Hendricks v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1102, 178 S.E. 8, 11 (1935). "Neces-
sary" has been defined as a reasonable belief by a police officer that unless deadly force is
used the suspect will escape. See Note, Officer's Right to Use Deadly Force to Arrest
Fleeing Arrestee, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 154, 159-61 (1950). See also Comment, supra note 7, at
367-68 n.28. A finding that deadly force was unnecessary meant there was no reason to
address the more difficult constitutional question. See Comment, Use of Deadly Force,
supra, at 145 n.31; see, e.g., Clark v. Ziedonis, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1975) (constitutional-
ity of the fleeing felon rule not reached).
15. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108
(1982) not unconstitutional on its face but insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force
against certain nonviolent felons).
16. See id. at 3.
17. See id. at 11.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 11-12.
21. This Note examines only instances where a suspect sustained injury from the un-
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sion also provided a basis for examining all future claims of excessive
force by police officers under a fourth amendment reasonableness stan-
dard as opposed to a fifth amendment due process standard.22 However,
some confusion has arisen over whether Garner should apply retroac-
tively to impose civil liability against a municipal defendant.23
II. RETROACTIVITY ANALYSIS
The Garner decision poses a novel retroactivity question: whether a
new fourth amendment limitation on police conduct should be applied
retroactively in a civil lawsuit.2a The general presumption has always
constitutional use of deadly force. It does not assess what constitutes deadly force,
whether a suspect must in fact be apprehended to permit a suit or if there is any remedy
for the mere use of deadly force without injury. Justice O'Connor raised these issues in
her dissent. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 31-32 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1987) (relying
on Garner in concluding that excessive force claims are to be examined under fourth
amendment balancing of interests test); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 261-62 & n.76
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (Garner's fourth amendment reasonableness standard applied to exces-
sive force claim as opposed to the due process standard of Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028, 1032-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973)); Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d
1380, 1384 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing Garner for proposition that fourth amendment
protects against unreasonable use of force in arrest process), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 752
(1988); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513, 516-17 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on Garner in
finding the means of an arrest unreasonable); Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412,
1419-23 (10th Cir. 1987) (applying Garner standard to use of deadly force to prevent
felon's escape); Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600, 602-03 (11 th Cir. 1987) (upholding
as reasonable jury finding that use of deadly force was unconstitutional under Garner
standard); Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1217 & n.3 (Ist Cir. 1986) ("clearly
established in December 1976" that use of deadly force to effect an arrest was a seizure
subject to fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement; whether the fleeing felon rule
was reasonable was a novel question in 1985); Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1386-87
(8th Cir. 1985) (relying on Garner in concluding that an otherwise permissible seizure can
be invalid if found to be unreasonable under the circumstances), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1253
(1988); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1209-11 (5th Cir. 1985) (Garner applied to
unreasonable police traffic stop).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Garner, a due process standard was some-
times applied to evaluate police use of force in effecting arrests. See Norris v. District of
Columbia, 737 F.2d 1148, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032-
33 (2d Cir. 1973). Under this approach, the use of force would be unconstitutional if the
police conduct "shocked the conscience." Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033 (quoting Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). In order to determine this, a court would examine "the
need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of
force that was used, the extent of injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good
faith effort ... or maliciously and sadistically ... ." Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.
23. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
24. The only explicit Supreme Court treatment of a similar question appears in Jus-
tice Powell's dissent in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 492-96 (1986) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). That decision involved a section 1983 action for damages in which the
petitioner claimed a violation of his fourth amendment rights. Police officers, acting
under the direction of the County Prosecutor, entered and searched the petitioner's office
without a search warrant in order to arrest a non-resident occupant. See id. at 472-73.
At that time, the Sixth Circuit permitted this type of search. See id. at 492-93 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). After the search, but before Pembaur's appeal, the Supreme Court held that
an officer may not search for a suspect in a third party's home without a warrant, unless
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been, and remains today, that judicial decisions apply retroactively.2"
Within the last twenty-five years, however, the Supreme Court has cre-
ated exceptions to this general rule.26 The Court has set forth separate
analyses for cases involving fourth amendment rules of criminal proce-
the third party consents or certain exigent circumstances exist to justify the search. See
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981). The Pembaur majority concluded
that the respondent had conceded the issue of retroactivity and therefore did not address
the question. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 477 n.5.
Justice Powell's dissent did address retroactivity. See id. at 492-96 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Without discussing other fourth amendment retroactivity analyses, Justice Powell
applied the civil retroactivity test of Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). See
Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 493-94. The dissent concluded that Steagald should not be applied
retroactively. See id. at 494.
25. See, e.g., Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S.
505, 507-08 (1973); see also Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1137-46 (6th
Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (providing an overview of principle), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 795 (1989). Chief Justice Marshall enunciated the foundations for this rule as early
as 1801:
[I]f subsequent to the judgment [in the trial court] and before the decision of the
appellate court a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs
.... the court must decide according to existing laws, and if it be necessary to
set aside a judgment ... which cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the
judgment must be set aside.
United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (footnote omit-
ted). The principle was reiterated by Justice Holmes: "I know of no authority in this
court to say that in general state decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial
decisions have had retrospective operation for near a thousand years." Kuhn v. Fair-
mont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehn-
quist stated: "The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial
decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student." United States v. Se-
curity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79 (1982). The presumption has been traced by the
Supreme Court to the Blackstonian theory that judges did not create law, but discovered
it. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965). Therefore, the newly discov-
ered law was in fact not new at all - it had always been the law. Judges merely discov-
ered the correct application of the existing law. For a complete discussion of the theories
surrounding the presumption of retroactivity, see Currier, Time and Change in Judge-
Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L. Rev. 201 (1965); Note, Confusion in Federal
Courts: Application of the Chevron Test in Retroactive-Prospective Decisions, 1985 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 117.
26. Retroactivity analysis is generally considered to have begun in 1965 with the
Supreme Court's decision in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). Linkletter stated
that a court, in considering the retroactivity question, "must ... weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id.
at 629. Linkletter analyzed the retroactivity of a decision holding that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause requires state courts to exclude from criminal trials evi-
dence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. See id. at 619-20. In examining the
retroactivity question, the Court considered three criteria: (1) the purpose to be served
by the new rule, (2) the reliance placed by the parties on the old rule, and (3) the effect
retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. See id. at 636. For a
discussion of the Linkletter decision and the retroactivity decisions that follow, see
Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va. L. Rev. 1557
(1975); Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "'As Applied" 61 N.C.L.
Rev. 745 (1983).
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dure and for cases concerning civil liability.2 7 Some courts have applied
the criminal procedure analysis to the Garner retroactivity question be-
cause civil liability is based on fourth amendment rules, which are ordi-
narily applied in criminal prosecutions.28 Nevertheless, under either
criminal or civil analysis, the Garner holding should be applied retroac-
tively in a civil case.
A. Fourth Amendment Criminal Procedure Retroactivity Analysis
Courts examining new rules of fourth amendment criminal procedure
apply different analyses depending on whether the retroactivity question
arises in a conviction on direct review or in one that is collaterally at-
tacked.29 In Griffith v. Kentucky,3 ° the Court stated that new rules of
criminal procedure were to be applied retroactively to all cases on direct
review.3" Conversely, new rules generally should not apply retroactively
to cases on collateral attack.32 Prior to the Griffith decision a new rule
would be applied retroactively to all cases unless it represented a "clear
break" from prior precedent.33
Justice Powell, in his dissent in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, questioned
whether a new rule of criminal procedure should ever apply retroactively
to create civil liability.34 He was concerned that the distinction in crimi-
nal retroactivity analysis between direct review and collateral attack
could produce the anomalous result of preventing the defendant from
benefitting from the new rule in a collateral attack on his criminal con-
viction while allowing the defendant to gain the benefit of the rule in his
27. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987); United States v. Johnson,
457 U.S. 537, 549-50 & n.12 (1982).
28. See Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 608-10 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff v. Abston, 762
F.2d 1543, 1548 & n.6 (11 th Cir. 1985); see also Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d
1119, 1145 n.3 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt J., dissenting) (consistency may require criminal
procedure retroactivity analysis apply to retroactivity questions concerning new fourth
amendment rules arising in civil litigation), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
29. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1071-72 (1989). A decision is considered
final, and thus subject only to collateral review, when a judgment has been rendered,
appeals exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari has expired. See Allen v.
Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n.1 (1986).
30. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
31. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
32. See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1075 (1989). In Teague, the Court stated
two exceptions to this general rule of nonretroactivity. First, a ruling that a trial court
lacked the authority to convict a defendant should be applied retroactively. See id. at
1075; United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989); Ingber v. Enzor,
841 F.2d 450, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1988). Second, the new rule should apply retroactively if it
requires the observance of "those procedures that ... are 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.'" Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1075. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937))).
33. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982) (if new rule created "an
entirely new and unanticipated principle of law" it should not be applied retroactively).
34. See Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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subsequent civil litigation.3" But this is not a concern in applying Garner
retroactively because the new rule announced in Garner has no applica-
tion in a criminal prosecution of the fleeing felon.
It is clear that Griffith mandates retroactive application of Garner be-
cause all civil litigation would be on direct review where the plaintiff is
seeking damages for the injury sustained from the unconstitutional use of
deadly force. In addition, two courts have applied Garner retroactively
under the pre-Griffith "clear break" analysis.36
The Eleventh Circuit applied the pre-Griffith standard of Johnson v.
United States37 because "civil liability would be based on a transgression
of duties imposed by constitutional rules of criminal procedure."38 The
Eleventh Circuit applied the Johnson "clear break" exception prior to the
Court's eliminating it in Griffith.3 9 The Second Circuit applied the John-
son analysis despite the Griffith decision." In the court's opinion, Grif-
fith did not change the Johnson analysis as it applied to the Garner
retroactivity question.4" The Second Circuit concluded that "no real
question of retroactivity arises 'when a decision of [the] Court merely
applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations.' "42
However, criminal retroactivity analysis seems inappropriate for the
Garner retroactivity question because of the distinction it draws between
cases arising on direct review and collateral attack. The Garner retroac-
tivity question will arise only on direct review. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court expressly stated in Griffith 43 that all questions of civil
retroactivity are to be governed by the standard announced in Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson.4 Thus, while retroactivity would be mandated under a
Johnson/Griffith analysis, civil retroactivity analysis is more appropriate
for a civil case.
B. The Civil Litigation Retroactivity Analysis:
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
In Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,45 the Court established a three-prong
35. See id. at 493-94 n.2.
36. See Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 608-10 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff v. Abston, 762
F.2d 1543, 1548-49. (1lth Cir. 1985).
37. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
38. See Acoff, 762 F.2d at 1548 n.6. The court noted, however, that it would apply
Garner retroactively under either the criminal or civil analysis.
39. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) (decided on January 13, 1987);
Acoff, 762 F.2d at 1543 (decided on June 12, 1985).
40. See Davis, 851 F.2d at 609.
41. See id.
42. Id. (quoting Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549).
43. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 n.8 (1987) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 563 (1982)).
44. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
45. For an overview of the Chevron test and an example of its application, see Note,
Wilson v. Garcia and Statutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Actions: Retroactive or Pro-
spective Application?, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 363 (1986).
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retroactivity analysis for federal civil litigation.46 These three prongs
have been labeled the reliance, purpose and inequity factors.4 7
The reliance prong of the Chevron test is considered the threshold
question." Under the reliance prong "the decision to be applied nonret-
roactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed."49 The purpose prong instructs a court to "weigh the merits and
demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in ques-
tion, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will fur-
ther or retard its operation."5 ° Last, under the inequity prong, a court
must "weigh ... the inequity imposed by retroactive application."',
In examining the threshold inquiry posed by Chevron's reliance prong
it is useful to refer to the "clear break" exception analysis that existed
prior to Griffith because it parallels the reliance prong under Chevron. 2
In United States v. Johnson, the Court set forth three criteria, any one of
which, if met, meant the new "ruling caused 'such an abrupt and funda-
mental shift in doctrine as to constitute an entirely new rule which in
effect replaced an older one.'-5 First, if the new decision explicitly
overruled prior Supreme Court precedent, it would not be applied retro-
actively.54 Second, if the law-changing decision disapproved of a practice
the Supreme Court arguably had sanctioned in prior cases, the decision
would be nonretroactive55 Third, retroactive application was considered
inappropriate if the Court's ruling overturned a longstanding and wide-
spread practice to which it had not spoken, but which a near unanimous
body of lower court authority had expressly approved. 6
46. See Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
47. See Note, supra note 25, at 123 (labeling the Chevron prongs reliance, purpose
and inequity factors).
48. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 n. 12 (1982) ("In the civil context
... the 'clear break' principle has usually been stated as the threshold test for determining
whether or not a decision should be applied nonretroactively."); see also Mitchell v. City
of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 718-19 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Chevron reliance prong as a
threshold test to Garner retroactivity question) (per curiam); Carter v. City of Chatta-
nooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (6th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
49. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 106-07.
51. Id. at 107.
52. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 550 n.12 (1982) (noting the "clear
break" principle in the civil context is a threshold question); see also Carter v. City of
Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Chevron but relying on
Johnson for framework of reliance prong analysis), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989);
Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548 n.6 (11th Cir. 1985) (court concluded it would
reach same result to the Garner retroactivity question under either the Johnson "clear
break" analysis or the Chevron test).
53. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982) (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc.
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III. APPLICATION OF THE CHEVRON RETROACTIVITY
ANALYSIS TO GARNER
A. The Reliance Prong of the Chevron Test
The Chevron reliance prong, as applied to Garner, determines whether
municipal reliance on the supposed constitutionality of a fleeing felon
statute was justified, thus requiring an exception to the general rule of
retroactive application. 7 In order to bar retroactive application, past
precedent must be undeniably clear 8 and create a sound reliance inter-
est, especially when a municipal defendant has infringed on a constitu-
tional right. 59
The Chevron reliance prong instructs a court to examine two ques-
tions, either one of which, if met, will satisfy the threshold inquiry.
First, a court must determine whether the law-changing decision over-
ruled "clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied."60 John-
son's three criteria are helpful in determining this question.6 Second, a
court must examine whether the decision was "an issue of first impres-
sion whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed."62
1. The Garner Decision: Clear Past Precedent?
The Court's decision in Garner neither overruled nor significantly
modified any Supreme Court precedent. Although split on the ultimate
holding, the Court unanimously agreed that the use of deadly force to
effect the arrest of a suspect was a seizure subject to the fourth amend-
ment's reasonableness requirement. 63 In order to determine if the seizure
was reasonable, the Court applied a balancing test, weighing "the nature
57. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
58. The Supreme Court has demonstrated the clarity of precedent required for a hold-
ing of nonretroactivity. In Saint Francis College v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987), the
Court did not apply Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), retroactively because the
prior circuit court precedent "clearly established" that a six year statute of limitations
applied to the plaintiff's section 1981 claim rather than the two year statute of limitations
suggested by Wilson. See Saint Francis, 481 U.S. at 608-09. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987), the Court applied Wilson retroactively because there was no
clear past precedent on which statute of limitations applied and therefore the plaintiff
could not justifiably rely on the longer six year period. See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 662-63.
Goodman and Saint Francis each addressed a section 1981 cause of action concerning the
same statute of limitations in the Third Circuit. The distinguishing factor was the timing
of the claims. In Saint Francis the suit was filed two years after the Third Circuit had
expressly held that a six year statute of limitations applied to section 1981 actions. See
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977); Wil-
son v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977). In Goodman the suit was filed
prior to the Third Circuit's holding that the longer statute applied. Therefore, the Good-
man decision was initiated when the circuit court precedent was not clear and thus reli-
ance was not justified. See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 663.
59. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
60. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971).
61. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
62. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106.
63. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 4, 25-26 (1985).
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and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
ests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus-
tify the intrusion."'
The Garner Court concluded that the suspect's interest in his own life,
and society's interest in allowing the judicial system to determine a per-
son's guilt and punishment, outweighed the state's interest in appre-
hending nonviolent felons.65 The Court's treatment of prior precedent in
Garner cannot be characterized as an unexpected modification of any es-
tablished rule.6 6 In fact, the Court merely applied a predictable and
traditional fourth amendment balancing of the interests test to what was
undeniably a fourth amendment seizure.67
The Garner decision did not disapprove a practice the Court had "ar-
guably" sanctioned in prior cases.6 8 Indeed, the use of deadly force to
effect the arrest of any fugitive had been questioned by at least one
Supreme Court Justice.69
Garner also did not overrule a "longstanding and widespread practice
...which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority [had] ex-
pressly approved.",7' Although a majority of courts addressing the ques-
64. Id. at 8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). The dissent
agreed that this is the proper test to apply to this question. See id. at 26 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). For other applications of this balancing of the interests test, see Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
65. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9-10.
66. See id. at 7-12. Garner was a novel decision because the Court had never before
held the method of an arrest to be unreasonable once an officer had probable cause to
make the arrest. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 120, 248
(1985). Garner may have been an unexpected decision because the Burger Court had
"generally curtailed the scope of fourth amendment protections and because federal and
state courts had been almost unanimous in upholding similar deadly force rules." See id.
(footnotes omitted). But none of these reasons involve any clear past precedent that
could have been relied on.
67. See Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d
1543, 1549 (1 lth Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit stated that while Garner went "beyond
merely applying past precedents," the decision did not announce a new rule of law, but
instead "applied a traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test to a particular set of
facts." Davis, 851 F.2d at 609. The court pointed out that the Garner decision did not
overrule or significantly modify any existing Supreme Court precedents. See id. The
Eleventh Circuit held "that the Garner decision was not an entirely new and unantici-
pated principle of law that would justify non-retroactivity." Acoff, 762 F.2d at 1549.
Although the court noted that the Garner decision applied a typical fourth amendment
balancing test, it did admit that the Garner decision was "not a simple application of past
precedent." Id.
68. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982).
69. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger drew an analogy to the
graded response for the use of deadly force in addressing the mechanical inflexibility of
judges in applying the exclusionary rule to all varying degrees of police error: "We, in
common with all rational minds, would say that the police response must relate to the
gravity and need; that a 'shoot' order might conceivably be tolerable to prevent the escape
of a convicted killer but surely not for a car thief, a pickpocket or a shoplifter." Id.
70. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551. Two circuit courts have applied the Johnson analysis
and concluded that Garner should be applied retroactively. See Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d
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tion of constitutionality had upheld the fleeing felon rule,71 the precedent
concerning the constitutionality of the rule falls far short of the "near-
605, 609 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1549 (11th Cir. 1985). But see
Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1129 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 795 (1989).
The court in Carter applied the Chevron civil standard. See id. at 1122-23 (applying
Chevron but agreeing with the Second and Eleventh Circuits that the novelty of the deci-
sion to be applied retroactively is the critical inquiry). The court concluded that "Garner
overturned 'a longstanding and widespread practice' the Supreme Court had previously
not addressed, 'but which a near-unanimous body of lower court authority ha[d] ex-
pressly approved.'" Id. at 1123 (quoting Johnson, 457 U.S. at 551). The Sixth Circuit
distinguished the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Acoff on the basis that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's precedent regarding the fleeing felon rule was not as clear in upholding the rule.
Concentrating on the foreseeability of the result in Garner, the court concluded that the
decision established a "new and unexpected principle of law by setting aside clearly estab-
lished precedent" within the Sixth Circuit. Id. at 1129.
71. See Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 718 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing cases
that upheld the fleeing felon rule) (per curiam); Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d
1119, 1123-29 (6th Cir. 1988) (same), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989); Leading Cases,
supra note 66, at 248; Recent Cases, Tennessee Code Section 40-7-108 Authorizing the Use
of Deadly Force by Police Officers Against an Unarmed Suspect of a Nonviolent Felony Is
Unconstitutional Under The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments-Garner v. Memphis
Police Department, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1155, 1159 (1983).
In Carter v. City of Chattanooga, the Sixth Circuit concluded thai Garner should not be
applied retroactively to a December 21, 1982 incident. See Carter, 850 F.2d at 1137. The
court pointed out that, prior to the Court's decision in Garner, no state had abandoned
the fleeing felon rule because it violated the Constitution. See id. at 1123. In addition,
the Sixth Circuit noted that, prior to its decision in Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 7 10
F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), no court had
held the fleeing felon rule unconstitutional under the fourth amendment. See id. The
court then went on to examine the prior decisions within the Sixth Circuit that had up-
held the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute. See id. at 1123-29 (evaluating Wiley v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Qualls
v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (per curiam); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.
Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971)).
The Tenth Circuit also declined to apply Garner retroactively in Mitchell v. City of
Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). The court noted that, prior to the
Garner decisions, no court had struck down the fleeing felon rule as violating the fourth
amendment. See id. at 717-18. The court also pointed out that the Tenth Circuit had
consistently judged this area of physical abuse by police officers under substantive due
process standards. See id. at 718.
The Tenth Circuit found the Sixth Circuit's decision in Carter "highly persuasive." Id.
It was the Sixth Circuit that first decided that the fourth amendment prohibited the use of
deadly force against nonviolent fleeing felons. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 600
F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979) (questioning the rule's constitutionality) (Garner I); Garner v.
Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240, 247 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the rule violated the fourth amendment) (Garner II). The
Sixth Circuit had decided not to apply this new rule retroactively to its own cases. See
Carter, 850 F.2d at 1137. The Tenth Circuit's analysis implied that the judges that held
the fleeing felon rule unconstitutional would support nonretroactive application of their
decision. However, no judge in the panel decisions of Garner I and Garner II joined in
the majority opinion of Carter. Three of the four judges involved in the Garner decisions
dissented in Carter. Judge Merritt, who wrote the majority opinions in Garner I and
Garner II, also wrote the dissent in Carter. Furthermore, in his dissent in Carter, Judge
Merritt accused the majority of denying retroactive application of Garner because of its
"hostility to the liberalization of the law by the Supreme Court and.., its zeal to show
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unanimous" requirement. Most of the litigation concerning the fleeing
felon rule involved the reasonableness of the police officer's conduct and
not the constitutionality of the rule itself.7" Therefore, the limited
number of decisions concerning the constitutionality of the rule cannot
be considered an extensive enough body of law to justify nonretroactiv-
ity.7 3 In addition, several courts did question the constitutionality of the
use of deadly force to effect the arrest of any felon.74 Likewise, for years
many judges and commentators had considered the fleeing felon rule
"morally wrong and constitutionally suspect. ' 75
Furthermore, the use of deadly force to effect the arrest of any felon
was not a "longstanding and widespread practice. ' 76 Although the ori-
gins of the fleeing felon rule date back to English common law, an over-
whelming majority of municipalities prohibited the use of deadly force
against nonviolent felons.77 In decisions barring retroactive application
because the new rule overturned a "longstanding and widespread prac-
tice," reliance by parties was consistently much more extensive.78
that the panel decisions.., in Garner I and Garner 11 were wrong." Carter, 850 F.2d at
1145 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
72. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
73. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1141 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). In Garner there was no clear past
precedent that established the constitutionality of the fleeing felon rule. While certain
circuits had upheld the fleeing felon rule, the constitutionality of the practice could not be
considered "clearly established." The Garner decision decided a "broad" question of
constitutional law, not a narrow, specific question of which state statute of limitations
should apply. See Carter, 850 F.2d at 1141 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The clarity of prece-
dent required for these questions is not the same. See Bradley v. School Board of Rich-
mond, 416 U.S. 696, 719 (1974) (when presented with issues of "great national concerns
... the court must decide according to existing laws" (quoting United States v. The
Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801))).
74. See Garner I, 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976),
vacated, Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (per curiam); see also Haislah v. Wal-
ton, 676 F.2d 208, 214 n.3 (6th Cir. 1982) (when apprehension of a fleeing felon is justifi-
cation for use of deadly force "the exoneration of the police officer does not necessarily
settle the constitutionality of his conduct or the liability of his governmental employer").
75. Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1140 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 551 (1982).
77. See supra notes 6, 10 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973). In Gosa, the Supreme Court
decided not to apply retroactively a decision which overturned the jurisdiction of military
courts to try servicemen for offenses that are not service related. See id. at 685. The
Court stated that this "new constitutional principle ... effected a decisional change in
attitude that had prevailed for many decades." Id. at 673. Because there was "justifiable
and extensive" reliance by the military on specific rulings of the Supreme Court the new
rule was applied prospectively. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). The Court had "long and
consistently" recognized that military status itself was sufficient for court-martial juris-
diction. See Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41, 243 (1960);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1957); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348
(1907); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167,
184-85 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2,
123 (1866). In the case of the fleeing felon rule, reliance by municipalities was not as
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2. The Garner Decision: Clearly Foreshadowed?
The Chevron reliance prong also asks whether the new decision was
"an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed."79 Garner did present an issue of first impression in the Supreme
Court. 0 Some authorities consider Garner to have been an unexpected
decision, 8 but the Supreme Court itself stated in Garner that the fleeing
felon rule was constitutionally suspect, as evidenced by the abandonment
of the rule by a large majority of police departments.82
Assuming that Garner was not clearly foreshadowed, this alone will
not bar retroactivity. Prior "first impression" decisions show that there
must be some compelling reason, other than the threat of civil liability, to
bar retroactive application.83 In these decisions the new rulings were ap-
plied prospectively, not only because they were unforeseen issues of first
impression, but because retroactive application would produce substan-
tial inequitable results or massive administrative disruptions.84
Furthermore, municipal defendants should be judged under a strict
standard of reliance when examining the retroactivity of a constitutional
decision." In Owen v. City of Independence,86 the Supreme Court stated
"extensive" nor were there any "specific" Supreme Court decisions to rely on. See
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1967) (prospective application of requirement
that counsel be present at pre-trial confrontation and identification). See infra note 84
and accompanying text.
79. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971). The dissent in Carter v. City
of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989), con-
cluded that this "first impression" test should not apply to the type of retroactivity ques-
tion posed by Garner, involving a constitutional issue and a city defendant. See Carter,
850 F.2d at 1142 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The majority in Carter held that if Garner "did
not overrule a clearly established precedent in the Supreme Court, [the case] decided 'an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.'" Id. at 1129
(quoting Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106).
The Tenth Circuit, in Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 717 (10th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam), concluded the Garner decision was "'an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.'" See Mitchell, 857 F.2d at 718 (quoting Chev-
ron, 404 U.S. at 106). The court did admit that a district court within the Tenth Circuit
had in fact foreseen what was to become the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Garner.
See id. at 718 n.2 (referring to Jacobs v. City of Wichita, 531 F. Supp. 129 (D. Kan.
1982)).
80. See supra note 79.
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
82. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985).
83. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1141 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
84. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88
(1982) (retroactive application of new rule would disrupt numerous bankruptcy deci-
sions); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (same); Allen v. State Board
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 571-72 (1969) (prospective application of new rule to prevent
voiding elections already held). This distinction prompted the dissent in Carter to con-
clude that "first impression" language should not be applied to the Garner retroactivity
question. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1142 (6th Cir. 1988) (Mer-
ritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
85. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1141-42 (6th Cir. 1988) (Mer-
ritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
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that municipalities were to be held liable for their constitutional viola-
tions "even where some constitutional development could not have been
foreseen by municipal officials." 87 The Owen holding flows from the
Court's desire to encourage municipal officials to err on the side-of pro-
tecting citizens' constitutional rights whenever these officials have'doubts
about the lawfulness of their intended actions.88 While the Supreme
Court's decision in Owen specifically addressed the issue of qualified im-
munity, not retroactivity, both doctrines are concerned primarily with
the reliance issue.8 9 The Owen decision demonstrates that municipalities
should only be shielded from liability when they have relied on sound,
clearly established legal principles. The fleeing felon rule was an out-
dated common law doctrine, no longer supported by any rational basis.90
Municipalities' reliance on the constitutionality of the fleeing felon stat-
ute was not justified and, therefore, insufficient to pass the threshold in-
quiry of the Chevron test. Chevron's second and third prongs also favor
retroactive application of Garner.
B. The Purpose Prong of the Chevron Test
The second prong of the Chevron test instructs the court to examine
the purposes of the new rule and determine whether retroactive applica-
tion will "further or retard" those goals.91 Although the primary pur-
pose of the Garner decision, to prevent the use of deadly force to effect
the arrest of nonviolent felons, would not necessarily be furthered by ret-
roactive application, lower courts typically examine a wide range of pur-
poses when addressing the retroactivity question.92 In considering the
Garner retroactivity question, courts have looked to the purpose of im-
posing liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 9'
86. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
87. Owen, 445 U.S. at 655 (1980) (emphasis added).
88. See id. at 651-52.
89. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1142 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt,
J., dissenting) ("issue of reliance that is common and crucial to both doctrines"), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). Compare United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 560
(1982) (discussing reliance interest involved in retroactively applying fourth amendment
decision in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)) and Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 273, 275 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (arguing that reliance in the "physical
trespass" wiretap rule of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), was not justifi-
able enough to bar retroactivity) with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-41
(1987) (discussing the reliance interest involved in individual government official's quali-
fied immunity) and Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52, 655, 657 (1980)
(holding that municipalities have no immunity based on their good-faith reliance on the
constitutionality of a practice).
90. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
91. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971).
92. See Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doctrine "As Applied", 61
N.C.L. Rev. 745, 769-70 (1983).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719 (10th
Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (examining the purpose of section 1983 actions); Carter v. City of




Section 1983 actions have two purposes: first, to deter constitutional
violations, and second, to provide compensation to victims of such viola-
tions.94 The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of imposing sec-
tion 1983 liability to further the goal of deterrence.95 The threat of
municipal liability will create an incentive for officials to protect citizens'
constitutional rights.9 6 One could argue that retroactive application of
Garner would provide little deterrent effect on municipalities because
courts erred in upholding the fleeing felon rule.97 However, municipali-
ties should not be permitted "to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided ap-
proach" with respect to citizens' constitutional rights.98 The few
municipalities that adhered to the fleeing felon rule did so despite any
reasonable basis for the rule and without regard to widespread criticism
of the moribund doctrine. 99 Retroactive application of Garner would
thus further the deterrence purpose of section 1983 actions by creating an
incentive for municipalities to be cognizant of infringing on citizens' fun-
damental constitutional rights."°
In addition, the threat of section 1983 liability is the only practical
means of deterring municipalities from authorizing the use of excessive
force in the arrest process.101 In most other fourth amendment retroac-
tivity cases, the exclusionary rule removes the incentive for officials to
violate constitutional rights. 102 In claims involving excessive use of force
in the arrest process, the exclusionary rule has no application. The
threat of civil liability is therefore essential to deter municipalities from
94. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (addressing the two
purposes of a section 1983 action as they apply to a municipal defendant).
95. See id. at 651-52.
96. In addressing the deterrence purpose, the Supreme Court stated in Owen:
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all of its injurious conduct,
whether committed in good faith or not, should create an incentive for officials
who may harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on
the side of protecting citizens' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat
that damages might be levied against the city may encourage those in a poli-
cymaking position to institute internal rules and programs designed to minimize
the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights. Such pro-
cedures are particularly beneficial in preventing those "systemic" injuries that
result not so much from the conduct of any single individual, but from the
interactive behavior of several government officials, each of whom may be act-
ing in good faith.
Owen, 445 U.S. at 651-52 (footnotes omitted).
97. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 348 (1987) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 917 (1984)); United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 866 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 711 (1988).
98. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 277 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
99. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
100. See Desist, 394 U.S. at 277 (Fortas, J., dissenting); Carter v. City of Chattanooga,
850 F.2d 1119, 1143-44 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
795 (1989).
101. See Carter, 850 F.2d at 1144.
102. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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implementing policies that impinge upon an individual's constitutional
fights.
The other purpose of section 1983 actions is to provide compensation
to victims of constitutional violations. 103 Retroactive application of Gar-
ner clearly furthers this purpose." ° Unless Garner is applied retroac-
tively, no compensation will be provided for these unconstitutional uses
of deadly force.
Although some courts have questioned the importance of the compen-
sation purpose of section 1983 actions, 0 5 the Supreme Court has empha-
sized that the damages remedy is necessary to provide an incentive for
aggrieved individuals to challenge the deprivation of a constitutional
fight not yet "clearly defined."' 6 In addition, it is even more important
to ensure that a municipality is liable for its constitutional violations be-
cause it is the very body responsible for protecting citizens' constitutional
fights. 107Thus, Chevron's second prong also favors retroactively applying
Garner because doing so would further the purposes of section 1983
actions.
C. The Inequity Prong of the Chevron Test
The final prong of the Chevron test provides that nonretroactivity is
possible only if retroactive application would produce "substantial ineq-
uitable results."'0 8 Retroactive application of Garner will clearly not
produce the substantial inequitable results needed to justify nonretroac-
103. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
104. See Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(focusing on the importance of the deterrent purpose); Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850
F.2d 1119, 1130, 1143-44 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (same), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 795 (1989).
105. See Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 719 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)
(compensation to victims, while important, is not the primary purpose of section 1983
liability); Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1130 (6th Cir. 1988) (under the
second Chevron standard the court concluded the primary purpose of imposing section
1983 liability was deterrence and that compensation to victims was "merely a conse-
quence" of a judgment), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989).
106. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 n.33 (1980). With respect
to the compensation purpose of section 1983 actions, the Court said "[a] damages remedy
against the offending party is a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished
constitutional guarantees . . . ." Id. at 651.
107. See id. at 651 ("[The importance of assuring [a damage remedy's] efficacy is only
accentuated when the wrongdoer is the institution that has been established to protect the
very rights it has transgressed."); Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190-91 (1970)
(same) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
108. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 107 (1971) (quoting Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969)). The final prong of the Chevron test requires a court to
weigh] the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision
of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroac-
tively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship'
by a holding of nonretroactivity."




tivity. First, retroactivity will simply require municipalities to compen-
sate victims for constitutional infringements. Second, there is no reason
to believe that retroactive application of Garner will cause a significant
financial hardship to a municipality.109 Finally, retroactive application
of Garner does not involve any of the hardships or injustices typically
associated with a holding of nonretroactivity.110
The inequity concerns are even less compelling when the issue is the
liability of a municipal defendant. There are two major equity considera-
tions in imposing section 1983 liability."' The first involves the injustice
of imposing liability on an official who acted in good faith in a position
requiring him to exercise discretion." 2 This is not a concern when the
defendant is a municipality because the award of damages will come
from the public treasury.11 3 The second equity issue is the possibility
that the threat of liability will inhibit officials from effectively executing
their duties. 4 As a practical matter, however, it is questionable whether
109. Two courts have applied Garner retroactively without even addressing this con-
cern. See Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff v. Abston, 762 F.2d
1543, 1548-49 (1 lth Cir. 1985). A number of courts have applied Garner retroactively to
civil litigation, implicating more widespread liability. See supra note 22 and cases cited
therein. Even courts denying retroactivity were uncertain as to the financial effects of
retroactive application of Garner. See Mitchell v. City of Sapulpa, 857 F.2d 713, 720(10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) ("the potential severe financial strain placed on cities by
retroactivity outweighs the plaintiffs' interest in compensation") (emphasis added);
Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1131 (6th Cir. 1988) (retroactive applica-
tion of Garner "might present severe financial strain in the case of smaller municipali-
ties.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). Furthermore, retroactive
application of Garner does not create boundless liability. The Memphis police (the de-
fendant in Carter and arguably one of the most frequent users of deadly force against all
felons) used deadly force 114 times between 1966 and 1974 on unarmed burglary, auto
theft and larceny suspects. During this period, 17 suspects were killed in Memphis by
police. See Comment, supra note 7, at 362 n.4 ("a decision to use deadly force against a
fleeing suspect is an extremely rare and tormenting choice for most policemen").
110. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1142 (6th Cir. 1988) (Merritt,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). The types of hardships normally impli-
cated in a holding of nonretroactivity involve overturning the jurisdiction of courts or
voiding elections. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
111. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654 (1980) (citing Wood v. Strick-
land, 420 U.S. 308 (1975)).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.; see also Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 492 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell thought that retroactive application of Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981), "would produce substantial inequitable results by imposing
liability on local government units for law enforcement practices that were legitimate at
the time they were undertaken." Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 494-95. Justice Powell expressed
concern about the possible "chilling effect" on law enforcement practices of applying new
rules of fourth amendment criminal procedure retroactively to civil cases. See id. at 495-
96. He believed that law enforcement officials (particularly prosecutors in this case) were
in a difficult position since "[tiheir affirmative duty to enforce the law vigorously often
requires them to take actions that legitimately intrude on individual liberties." Id. at 495.
Although any doubt about the constitutionality of their actions should cause government
officials to "'err on the side of protecting citizens' rights,'" id. (quoting Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980)), Justice Powell argued that these prosecutors
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the threat of municipal liability will deter officials from effectively per-
forming their duties, since public officials routinely make decisions that
impact upon the public treasury.1 15 Moreover, the concern that a munic-
ipality will be held accountable for its constitutional violations is a
proper consideration of municipal officials. 16
Although it may be argued that public funds should not used to com-
pensate specific groups of individuals, the Supreme Court has indicated
that damages imposed upon municipalities that violate individuals' con-
stitutional rights are part of the inevitable cost of government borne by
all taxpayers.117 The Supreme Court has concluded that it is fairer to
place the financial burden of civil damages on the municipality, and thus
on society as a whole, than to deny recovery to an individual whose con-
stitutional rights have been violated. 118 The inequity of imposing liability
on a municipality seems insignificant when compared to the inequity of
denying compensation for the wrongful killing of an individual.119
CONCLUSION
Retroactivity analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court's decision
in Tennessee v. Garner should be applied retroactively to civil litigation.
First, there was no clear past precedent that enabled parties to justifiably
rely on the outdated fleeing felon rule. The constitutionality of the rule
had not been clearly established. Furthermore, the fact that the rule had
been widely criticized indicated that the rule was constitutionally sus-
pect. Second, retroactive application of Garner will further the purpose
of section 1983 by deterring municipal infringements on constitutional
should not be deterred from enforcing the law when there is no reason to doubt the
constitutionality of their actions. See id. This "unwarranted deterrence" might discour-
age valid law enforcement practices and hamper the criminal justice system. Id. at 495-
96. In Justice Powell's opinion there was no reason for the prosecutor to question the
lawfulness of his actions when the law of the Sixth Circuit had previously authorized
such action. However, Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in Pembaur, noted that just
because a circuit court's precedent disagrees with a subsequent Supreme Court ruling
does not mean that the ruling is to be "presumptively nonretroactive" in that circuit. See
id. at 488-89 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 654-56 (1980).
116. See id. at 656.
117. See id. at 654-55.
118. See id. at 655.
119. See Carter v. City of Chattanooga, 850 F.2d 1119, 1144-45 (6th Cir. 1988) (Mer-
ritt, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795 (1989). Ironically, the Sixth Circuit, in
denying retroactive application of Garner, stressed the inequity of retroactive application.
See Carter, 850 F.2d at 1123 ("The underlying concern expressed in these cases is the
inequity and harshness retroactive application of a new rule of law would impose on
parties who had no significant reason to doubt the validity or constitutionality of a statute
or practice."). Under the third Chevron standard, the court concluded it would be ineq-
uitable to impose liability "on local government units for law enforcement practices that
were legitimate at the time they were undertaken." Id. at 1131 (quoting Pembaur v.
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting)). In the court's opinion, a
municipality should not be concerned about possible civil liability when exercising its
police powers pursuant to a valid state statute. See id.
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rights and providing compensation to victims of constitutional violations.
Finally, retroactivity of Garner will not produce the substantial inequita-
ble results that are required to bar retroactive application. It will merely
require municipalities to compensate victims of their constitutional
violations.
Municipalities that implemented the fleeing felon rule did so without
regard to the widespread criticism of the rule and its lack of a justifiable
rationale. Retroactivity analysis concludes that these municipalities can-
not shield themselves from liability for their infringement on the fourth
amendment right protected in the Garner holding.
John G. Crowley

